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There are two reasons why the concept of authority has been found puzzling by 
philosophers, jrurists, and political theorists, of which the first is this. The gunman 
points his gun at my breast and orders me to hand over my wallet; the tax collector 
or some other government official orders me to pay so many dollars as a tax or as a 
fine. What is the difference between these two situations? We are all-at least in our 
non-philosophical moments-convinced that there is a difference, and a massive one. 
[t is when we try to say just what the difference is that we begin to falter. 
One thing these two situations have in common. Like the gunman, the State is 
co-ercive; if I don't obey the orders of its officials I am in for trouble. One obvious 
difference lies in the fact that, while the power of the gunman over me is local and 
temporary, lasting only so long as he wields the gun, the power of the State is per­
vasive and enduring. But is that all? Is the State merely the gunman writ large? 
Some writers, for example Hobbes and John Austin, have thought that it was, and 
it is not difficult to think of cases for which this account of authority as the exer­
cise of naked power on a large scale seems appropriate. For example, in the seven­
teenth century there was a district in London called Alsatia, ruled by a gang of cut­
throats and theives, into which peaceful citizens and even the officers of the State 
hardly dared enter, and this has been true of some parts of American cities of our 
own day. From the point of view of the Jewish community the 'authorities' of the 
Third Reich were exercising naked power and nothing else. But even in such cases 
this identification of authority with naked power will not do; for as soon as we pass 
from the solitary gunman to the�. we are faced with the fact that the boss of 
the gang must sometimes take time off for sleep. As Hume shrewdly pointed out, 
"The Sultan o f  Egypt or the Emperor of Rome might drive his harmless subjects 
like brute beasts ... but he must at least have led his mamelukes or pretorian bands 
like men by their opinions."(1) It may have been by naked power that Hitler cowed 
many of the Jews into compliance with his will, but it cannot have been by naked 
power that he controlled the S.S. He controlled them because they accepted his 
authority, recognized his right to give them orders-. 
Robert Paul Wolff, whose-excellent little book I shall use as a stalking horse, de­
fines authority as "the right to command and, correlatively, the right to be obeyed. 
It must be distinguished from power which is the ability to compel compliance, 
either through the use or the threat of force."(2) This way of distinguishing auth­
ority from power is familiar enough; but it doesn't get us very far since, if the con­
cept of authority is a puzzling one, so too is that of a right to command and a right 
to be obeyed. What is it to have a right? And what could give anyone a right to give 
me orders with a corresponding duty on my part to obey them? Defining 'authority' 
in this way gives rise to the second of the two sources of puzzlement-the so-called 
Paradoxes of Authority. 
The paradoxes run as follows: First, to submit to authority is to obey the com-
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mands of someone who has authority, and to obey is not just to comply with those 
commands, to do what he tells you to do. It is to do what he tells you to do because 
you recognize his right to tell you what to do; it is the fact that it is he, rather than 
some non-authoritative person, who tells you what to do that constitutes your rea­
son for doing what he tells you. But now, it is argued, such obedience to authority 
can never be rational and can never be moral. It can never be rational because it is 
never rational to act against one's own best interests, and the authority might com­
mand you to do just that; and it cannot be moral since to submit to authority is to 
place decision-making in the hands of another and thus to forfeit one's own moral 
autonomy; and to do that, it is said, can never be morally right. "For the autono­
mous llJ.�n", writes Wolff, "there is no such thi,ng, strictly speaking, as a com­
mand. "t ::S) 
No one, as far as I know, has given an analysis of authority which is adequate in 
the sense of successfully capturing the difference between the gunman and the tax 
man and at the same time successfully resolving the paradoxes. Wolff set out to do 
precisely that, but in the course of trying to explain what authority is and why it is 
sometimes rational and moral to submit to it, he came to the conclusion that the 
task is impossible. So his book, which started out as a justification of political obli­
gation, ended as a defence of anarchism. Today, instead of trying to solve the prob­
lem that so many theorists have failed to solve, I shall try to show why they have 
failed, and this means raising what are essentially methodological issues. I shall talk, 
that is to say, not about authority, but about how to tackle problems about author­
ity and, indeed, many other problems in political philosophy. I am sure this will 
elicit groans-more philosophical hair-splitting and nit-picking! Why not get on with 
the job of saying what authority is and why we should sometimes submit to it? My 
reply is simple. Those who have tackled the real problems have failed because they 
have used inadequate tools, and I do not intend to swell their ranks. 
II 
My overaU complaint against the writers, classical and modern, who have tackled 
these problems is that they over-simplify to a disastrous extent. They offer analyses 
of the central concepts such as 'right', 'obligation', 'duty' and 'authority' itself 
which fail to do justice to the complexity and subtlety of these concepts as we actu­
ally use them, and the complexities and subtleties are not mere superficial nuances 
but fundamental to the use of the concepts. This shows up first in the tendency to 
be spell-bound by dichotomies. The contrast between the policeman and the gun­
man presupposes that we can draw a sharp distinction between the right of the for­
mer and the mere power of the latter.Tut is the distinction really all that sharp? 
Perhaps we can find examples of naked power and perhaps, in spite of Wo lff, we 
shall be able to find examples of genuine authority; but the world of politics lies al­
most wholly in .the gray area in between. I have already referred to parts of Ameri­
can cities effectively controlled by criminal gangs; but what of whole cities control­
led, often for long periods, by political bosses who, though they occupy positions 
such as that of mayor which gives some color of right to their regimes, are only able 
to acquir'.? and retain control by the exercise or the threat of force? Given what we 
now know about the ways in which ex-President Nixon acquired and retained the 
Presidency, we clearly could not take him as a paradigm case of someone who exer­
cised legitimate authority. But, what is more to the point, we could not take any 
American president as paradigmatic, knowing as we do that they have all depended, 
to a greater or lesser extent, on political machines which, in turn, make use o:f meth-
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ods which, in terms of Wolff's sharp distinction, must be classified as the u:se or 
threat of force. To this Wolff might reply that a successful justification of political 
obligation by no means requires the existence of any State governed by legitimate 
authority; he was concerned to delineate what, if it existed, would be a State to 
whose authority the rational autonomous man could submit. Why did he come to 
the conclusion that that task was impossible? Because, I submit, his accounts of 
authority and of autonomy are so set up that it is transparent and hardly in need of 
argument that the two cannot be combined.(4) So be it; but the conclusion I would 
draw is not Wolff's defence of anarchism, but that something is wrong with his ac­
counts of authority and autonomy. 
In the same way, the paradoxes depend for their plausibility and even for their 
formulation on the possibility of drawing a sharp distinction between obeying a 
command, which involves submission to authority, and mere compliance for some 
other reason with someone's advice, request, or threat. Wolff illustrates his point 
that for the autonomous man there is no such thing as a command by the example 
of the sinking ship. The captain orders everyone to the life-boats and I go along 
with the rest. Am I obeying his order, which involves submitting to his authority 
and thus forfeiting my autonomy, or do I merely accept his advice-doing what he 
tells me to do because it seems to me the best thing to do in my own judgement on 
the merits of the case? Of course, one factor in the situation which makes it reason­
able for me to do what the captain says is that other, non-autonomous people are 
obeying his order, and if I buck the trend I am liikely to do more harm than good; 
but that is the only difference made by the fact that it is the captain rather than a 
mere passenger who is telling everybody what to do. Taking that feature of the situ­
ation into account I am still, according to Wolff,doing what I think best on the mer­
its of the case. "I would make the same decision, for exactly the same reasons, if 
one of the passengers had started to is_pue'orders'and had, in the confusion, come to 
be obeyed."(5) 
Even if Wolff is right in saying that it makes no difference whether it is the cap­
tain or a mere passenger who is telling everyone to .go to the life-boats-and I shall 
argue later that he is not-his distinction between authority and naked power is too 
sharp. It cannot cope with borderline cases. Suppose that while the ship is sinking 
the captain and crew are all drunk or in a panic and that a mere passenger takes, as 
we say, command. His posture, mien, coolness in a crisis, and commanding tone­
perhaps he is a recently retired colonel-all these contribute massively to the end re­
sult, that the passengers do what he tells them to do. Is he, in terms of Wolfrs dich­
otomy, exercising authority or compelling compliance by the use or the threat of 
force? Neither answer is appropriate. He is not in a position to use or to threaten 
force; the threat lies in the situation itself, and if he says "Do as I say or you will all 
drown" he is not threatening to kill them but predicting their death. But is he exer­
cising authority? If so he must, according to Wolff, have a right to issue those crisp 
commands. Or are his words to be taken as a request, plea, or piece of advice? That 
too would mischaracterize the situation; for if he had said in a quiet and humble 
tone "Please do as I say; I think you will find on reflection that it is the only way to 
save your skins," the other passengers would probably not have followed his lead. 
The concept of authority is tailor-made to fit this sort of situation. Though he is 
not a person 'in authority' in any formal sense, the other passengers treat his in· 
structions as authoritative, as if they were the commands of an authority-that is to 
say they do not think the matter through and make their own judgement on the 
merits of the case. Whether, in so doing, they forfeit their autonomy and, if so, cul­
pably, are questions for which we are not yet ready. The point now is that his influ-
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ence over them is of too subtle a kind to be captured either by the dichotomy be· 
tween authority (defined as a right to command) and naked power or by that be­
tween commanding and advising. 
III 
My next two points go together since they are both criticisms of the classical ap­
proach to the analysis of concepts that runs from Aristole to Russell and is still 
widely practiced. This analysis is linear in the sense that it consists in explicating a 
puzzling concept by defining it in terms of other concepts and defining those in 
turn until we reach a set of concepts that are so clear as to need no further explica­
tion. I have no doubt that this method is enlightening in some areas-for example, 
as used by Russell in the philosophy of logic and mathematics; but in other areas it 
is apt to be more misleading than helpful. The basic concepts of political philosophy 
are rights, duties, obligation, authority and obedience-and perhaps some others. 
Now I do not doubt that we can give rough accounts of some of these concepts in 
terms of the others or that we can do this in different ways, the choice between 
which is arbitrary. But this technique of linear analysis is bound to end in a dilem· 
ma: either we shall be left with at least one undefined concept in the group or we 
shall have to define all the concepts in the group in terms of concepts lying outside 
it, as Russell and Whitehead did when they defined the concepts of mathematics in 
terms of those of logic. But if we adopt the first course we are liable to find that, 
however efficiently we can trace the connections between concepts in the group, a 
grasp of the system as a whole eludes us. We can, for example, define 'authority' as 
Wolff does in terms of 'right' and 'command', but since these concepts are just as 
puzzling as that of authority we haven't advanced very far. On the other hand, if we 
adopt the second course we are in danger of 'reducing' the entire vocabulary of poli­
tics to something which it clearly is not. 
Examples of the latter error are not far to seek. In the end Hobbes has to define 
'right' in terms of the sheer power of God who, he says, "by right, that is by abso­
lute power, commandeth all things," Here Hobbes frankly equates ffight with 
Might, at least in the case of God, and he is followed by John Austin who even at 
the secular level defined political obligation in terms of the sheer power of a sovere­
ign who is :able and willing to enforce his commands. The motive for attempting to 
reduce complex and puzzling notions to (apparently) simpler and more transparent 
ones is clear. All of us some of the time and some of us all the time feel a need to 
descend from nebulous and obscure complexities and abstractions to the firm 
ground of hard, observable fact. Nevertheless (and to repeat,) such attempts to re­
duce concepts that puzzle us to concepts that do not often leave us with an uneasy 
feeling that something, if not everything, has been thrown away in the course of the 
reduction. 
In place of the method of linear analysis I would suggest the following method 
derived from Professor H.L.A. Hart. Since all these puzzling concepts hang together, 
we should first describe in some detail a standard or central case to which they 
clearly apply. At this stage we should leave aside doubtful, off-beat, and bizarre ex­
amples and above all leave aside all questions about ultimate justification. The ques­
tions that we eventually want to answer are Wolff's questions, 'Can authority ever 
be legitimate?' and 'Can a rational autonomous man ever submit to authority?'; but 
the time to raise these is after, not before we have a reasonably clear grasp of what 
rationality, autonomy, and authority�· So we should start with a clear example 
of someone who has (at least from an initial commonsense point of view) authority 
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and contrast it with an equally clear example of someone who does not. In fact 
most writers do start in this way, as Wolff does when he contrasts the tax collector 
with the gunman; but the trouble is that, in their eagerness to get on to the really in­
teresting questions, th�y give far too jejune a description of the standard case and 
use phrases such as 'forfeiting authority' and 'taking responsibility for one's actions' 
as if the jejune examples had made them sufficiently clear. 
What I am about to say about Wolff's definitions and examples is in one way un­
fair. 'Autonomy' means literally '·making one's own laws' and according to Kant 
who, I believe, introduced the word into moral philosophy, an autonomous man is 
one who acts on laws that he has made for himself. Wolff writes explicitly in the 
Kantian tradition and, given his account of submitting to authority, it is clear from 
the start that authority and autonomy are going to clash head-on. Various writers 
have tried to forestall the fatal collision by claiming that if a State has certain kinds 
of democratic institutions it can have authority because in it I do-in a way-make 
my own laws. What Wolff does in the second part of his book is to show that all 
these maneuvers are specious, and here I think he is entirely successful. My doubts 
begin further back-with the concepts of authority and autonomy that he employs. 
For example, it is not entirely clear what it is to forfeit one's autonomy. Presum­
ably this is a voluntary and intentional act; a man whose brain is so damaged in an 
accident that he is thereafter deprived of the power to think and choose would not 
be said to have forfeited his autonomy, but someone who chose to get blind drunk, 
knowing that he would be deprived of those powers, would. (6) 
The crucial case, however, is that of the man who substitutes the judgement and 
will of another for his own; if I resolve (autonomously) to do whatever X tells me 
to do even if it does not seem to me the best thing to do on the merits of the case, 
have I forfeited my autonomy or not? I have certainly substituted the judgement 
and will of another for my own; but it could also be argued that in doing what he 
tells me to do I am acting on the rule 'Do whatever X says', a rule that I have made 
myself, so that in Kantian terminology the maxim o!my action is still autonomous. 
Wolff seems to take the former view since, in the example of the doctor, he tells us 
that "it is obvious that there are at least some situations in which it is reasonable to 
give up one's autonomy. Indeed, we may wonder whether, in a complex world of 
technical expertise, it is ever reasonable not to do so. "(7) But now rationality and 
autonomy seem to have split apart in a way that must be at least embarrassing, if 
not disastrous for Wolff; and it is difficult to reconcile the view that it is often rea­
sonable to give up one's autonomy, with the very strong words that Wolff uses 
about men standing "under a continuing obligation to take responsibility for (their 
actions)"-where taking responsibility for one's actions has previously been equated 
with autonomy. Are we under a continuing obligation to forfeit, at times, our ra­
tionality? 
It is a good deal more difficult to characterize a patient's relation to his doctor 
than Wolff makes out. We speak of 'obeying doctor's orders'; yet, according to stan­
dard medical ethics, a patient who does what the doctor tells him to do is only tak­
ing advice, not obeying orders. But 'taking advice' doesn't really fit either, since the 
case is significantly unlike that of a man who consults a wise friend in a difficult sit­
uation in which technical expertise is not available. In that sort of case a man who 
asks the advice of another must take responsibility for the outcome whether he 
takes the advice or not; whichever he does, he cannot shift the blame, if things go 
ill, onto the advisor. But where, as in the case of the doctor, expertise is involved, 
this is not so. If the case concerns well-established medical facts, a patient who did 
not do what the doctor told him to do would certainly be held responsible for an 
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ensuing disaster; but if he did what the doctor told him to do and that turned out 
to be disastrous, he neither would nor, I submit, should be held to blame. The case 
comes near to that of the soldier who can shift the blame by saying that he was on­
ly obeying a proper order. 
In the same passage, Wolff tells us that "there are many forms and degrees of for­
feiture of autonomy"; but this suggests, first, that some of them might be compat­
ible with submission to authority and thus destroy his basic contention that for the 
autonomous man there is no such thing as a command. Secoocily it suggests the possi­
bility that to forfeit one's autonomy might be the right thing to do. Unless the 
forms and degrees are further analysed and classified we are left in the dark. Then 
again, Wolff never makes clear the difference between the example of the doctor 
and that of the captain of a sinking ship. "Authority", he tells us, "resides in per­
sons; they possess it-if indeed the1 do at all-by virtue of who they are and not by 
virtue of what they command." (8) So if, as Wolff seems to think, a doctor has 
authority, he has it because he is a doctor; and if so, why should a ship's captain not 
have authority because he is the captain of the ship? And if doing what the doctor 
says involves no forfeiture of rationality and either no forfeiture or non-culpable 
forfeiture of autonomy, why does this not apply in the case of the captain? Yet 
Wolff clearly thinks that there is a difference since he thinks that an autonomous 
man who does what the captain says does not obey the captain but acts on his own 
judgement. Like Wolff, I also believe that there is a difference, and I shall try to say 
later what it is. I raise these difficulties now, not because I think he cannot meet 
them, but because he has not met them in advance. His examples are too thinly de­
scribed to give us a sure grasp of the key concepts of morality, rationality, autono­
my, and authority, and without such a grasp we are in no position to tackle impor­
tant questions about their relations. My basic objection is the same as Hart's objec­
tion against Austin-that he tries to construct the fabric of the State out of an inad­
equate set of building blocks. It is as if one were to try to build a medieval cathe­
dral out of standard prefabricated parts. But it takes Hart some fifty pages to show 
why Austin's analysis must be inadequate and another fifty to construct a more 
plausible moded 9 J There is no shorter way. 
But how could we set about trying to say what authority is? Well, one can come 
to know what an apple is without knowing that apples are bought, cooked, and eat­
en. But in the case of an abstract concept such as that of authority this is, I submit, 
not so. Authority can be granted, refused, claimed, exercised, recognized, denied, 
challenged, delegated, abused, flouted, aped, and so on. To adopt J.L. Austin's 
terminology, all these are speech-acts, things that we do with words; and it is in and 
by doing them that we participate in a practice with important moral and political 
consequences. (That is why the study of speech-acts is not the mere fooling around 
with words that some people think it is.) My claim here is a double one: first that 
we cannot understand what authority is unless we understand this complex social 
practice, and secondly that when we do understand it there is no further question 
as to what authority is. (Whether a rational autonomous man can ever participate in 
this practice to the extent of recognizing authority is, of course, another matter.) 
IV 
If we look at the concept of authority in this way as a network of social prac­
tices-of what people do and say, and do in and by saying-it seems to be clear that 
the central speech-acts, which I take to be claiming, recognizing, and refusing to re­
cognize authority, all involve an appeal to a rule under which the various claims and 
8 
7
Nowell-Smith: What is Authority?
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1976
PATRICK NOWELL-SMITH 
counter-claims are made. So, our first need is to examine the puzzling concept of a 
rule and of what it means to say that{ in a certain society, such and such a rule ex­ists. Here again I shall follow Hart. (lOJ 
-To say that in a certain community there is a rule to the effect that one ought to 
do such and such is to say much more than that the people concerned have a cus­
tom or habit of so doing. Suppose that almost all the people in the village go t o  the 
movies almost every Saturday night. On that basis alone we can say that they have a 
custom of so doing; but if a single eccentric never goes to the movies, though we 
can say that he does not conform to the custom, we cannot say that he has broken 
a rule. For a rule to exist it is further necessary that he should be criticized for his 
nonconformin,g behaviour, required to submit a jUJstification or excuse, and subject· 
ed to penalties, even if only of an informal kind, if he cannot do so. Moreover, any­
one who participates in such a rule-governed practice applies the rules to himself as 
well as to others. He will recognize the justice of the claims made on him and of the 
accusations made against him and he will even, as Plato said, willingly submit to 
such sanctions as he has, under the rules, incurred. 
Such a man adopts, in Hart's terminology, the internal point of view towards the 
system of rules. He treats the rules as guides for his own conduct and that of others, 
appeals to them in criticizing others, and admits the validity of such appeals when 
made by others against him-in short, he � the rules for these various 'moves' in 
the 'game' of social intercourse. By contrast to adopt the external point of view is 
merely to observe and record the fact that those who play the game or participate 
in the practice have a system of rules towards which they adopt the internal point 
of view without adopting that point of view oneself. The external point of view is 
that adopted by an anthropologist studying the rule-system of another society; it is 
also that of an ·atheist living in a theocratic society. The rulers of that society tell 
everyone what they ought to do, bl}Sing their commands on what they and their 
subjects believe to be the commands of God. The atheist might well comply with 
their rules, eit!her out of fear of the consequences of deviation or because he does 
not wish to off end people, but he does not obey these commands because, not be­
lieving the credentials of the rulers, he does not recognize their right to command 
him. 
All this has an obvious affinity with much that Wolff says about the difference 
between compliance and obedience, about the difference between the normative 
and the descriptive concept of authority, about the distinction between de jure and 
de facto authority. Wolff sees clearly that a sceptic who doubts the possibility of de 
]ure authority can distinguish between de facto authority and naked power. To say 
that the King of Ruritania has de facto authority is to make an empirical statement 
incompatible with the statement that he rules by the exercise of naked power since 
it is, according to Wolff, to say that Ruritanians !believe that their king has de jure 
authority. But if this is any ordinary sort of belief it can be tested for truth or for 
whatever, in the case of normative utterances, corresponds to truth in the case of 
descriptions. S o ,  if authority is always authority under some rule, what we have to 
do is to formulate a fundamental rule or set of rules by reference to which the claim 
to authority of the King of Ruritania (or the Crown in Parliament or the American Con­
stitution or the Politburo) can be tested for validity. But now the spectre of an in­
finite regress arises. Under what rule does our new fundamental system of rules have 
authority? Clearly, if the regress is to be blocked, there can be no such rule; our 
fundamental set of rules must be genuinely fundamental, such that it requires no 
foundation. What is needed is a Transcendental Deduction of the Idea of the Stat� 
a ground rule of which we can somehow demonstrate, without having any rule a-
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mong our premises, that it must be accepted by all rational men. This is the task 
that Wolff set himself, and it is because he came to recognize it as hopeless that he 
had to conclude that there can be no such things as a de jure state or legitimate 
authority and that, in consequence, for the autonomous maii1liere is no such thing 
as a command. 
But this despair stems, l suggest, from Wolff's handling of the normative/descrip­
tive and de jure/de facto distinctions as matters of the truth of a belief. He treats 
the question 'Does X have de iure authority?' as if it could be asked and answered 
from, as it were, a neutral standpoint outside political space, a standpoint that is 
not that of one of the participants in the practice within which alone the concept of 
authority has a place. According to Wolff we can classify states into de facto states 
and de iu.m states-though we may well find that the latter class is emptY.111) But 
this is not in fact the way in which the expressions 'de facto' and 'de jure' are used 
in their natural habitat-international relations. If the government of State A recog­
nizes X as having de facto authority in State B it is not asserting or expressing a be­
lief that X i s  acknowledged to be their legitimate ruler by the inhabitants of B­
though it may well believe this, and the belief may be one of its reasons for recog­
nizing the de facto authority of X in B. In the speech-act of recognizing X's author­
ity in !!., it is announcing its willingness to treat X, rather than Y or �,as the per­
son or body with whom it will carry on diplomatic relations, make treaties, and 
so on. (After all, one must negotiate with somebody, and one can only negotiate 
effectively with someone who has effective power.) For it to recognize X as 
having de.jure authority is to take the further step of endorsing X's claim. Just what 
this extra step amounts to is something that could only be gathered from a detailed 
examination of the complexities of international law; but one thing is clear: recog­
nizing de facto and recognizing de jure authority are distinct speech-acts, neither of 
which is to be understood in terms of making different assertions or-the truth or fal­
sity of a belief .. 
If we adopt Hart's richer concept of the existence of a rule and pay more atten­
tion to the gieat variety of speech-acts which that concept invokes, the problem ap­
pears in a different and more hopeful light. An official of a regime who claims auth­
ority over me In some respect is both asserting that there is a rule of the system 
which empowers him to give me such and such an order and using the rule as back· 
ingfor his claim; and since he is doing two things, I can counter his claim in two dif­
ferent ways. First, I can assert that there is no such rule, and if I take that line there 
is a genuine contradiction-assertion and denial of a proposition that can be tested 
for truth. (In practice, things are not always as simple as that,, since rules are often 
not crystal clear. That is why we need courts to interpret them, and this, as we shall 
see, has important consequences for the concept of authority.) Now, if I take this 
line, I thereby show that, like the official, I myself adopt the internal point of view 
towards the regime. But I might deny his authority, not on the grounds that he has 
made a mistake about the rules, but on the grotllnds that I do not recognize the val­
idity of the system, while agreeing that the rule to which he points is a valid rule of 
that system. In taking this line I show that, unlike him, I do not adopt the internal 
point of view towards the system under which he has authority. To be sure, there is 
a conflict here-a conflict which may end in tragedy, my death or a civil war. But 
there is no contradiction, if by 'contradiction' we mean assertion and denial of the 
same proposition, and there is no paradox. For the claims and counter-claims which 
constitute the social practice can be made from different points of view and t!here is 
no neutral point of view which is neither that of an official or a citizen from which 
they can be assessed for validity. 
10 
9
Nowell-Smith: What is Authority?
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1976
PATRICK NOWELL-SMITH 
v 
To adopt, as most of us dlo most of the time, the internal point of view towards 
the State is to do more than to comply with the commands of its officials out of 
sheer habit or fear, or to treat those commands as pieces of advice. It is to recognize 
as valid the system of rules under which certain persons have a right to give orders 
with a corresponding duty of obedience, and this in tum means that we are pre­
pared to use the rules of the system in making the claims and counter-claims that 
constitute the practice. So the question 'Can a rational, autonomous man submit to 
authority?' which Wolff raised and to which he found himself, to his surprise, bound 
to answer 'No', can be reformulated as 'Can a man adopt the internal point of view 
towards a system of rules which he himself has not made without sacrificing his ra­
tionality and autonomy?'. This is the question to which I shall try to provide the 
sketch of an answer-but only after a little more clarification. 
First, to adopt the internal point of view towards a system of rules by no means 
requires treating the authority of the officials of the system as unlimited. We norm­
ally adopt the internal point of view towards the rales of a game for the good reason 
that the game could not go on unless we did; but a player who recognizes the right 
of an umpire to send him off the field does not recognize his right to order him to 
commit suicide_ However, things are different when we come to the State, first be­
cause subordinate systems of rules such as those of a game, a club, or a school are 
under the over-arching jurisdiction of the State and secondly because you cannot 
just give up being a citizen of the State as you can resign from a club. 
Nevertheless, even in the case of the State adopting the internal point of view 
does not require treating the authority of its officials as unlimited. This is clearly 
true in the case of subordinate officials, since their authority is limited by the rules 
themselves. There are orders which Si policeman, or even a prime minister, cannot 
give. In a complex modern State, indeed, it is impossible to find any person or body 
of persons who has unlimited authority. But Jet us, in order to simplify matters and 
to face the issue head-on, adopt the semi-fiction that, in Canada, the Crown in Par­
liament is supreme. It is one thing to adopt the internal point of view towards 
this system, which entails recognizing the Crown in Parliament as the supreme 
authority, but quite another to recognize that authority as unlimited. To do that 
would be to acknowledge a duty of obedience to all its orders no matter what its 
orders were, and to do that is clearly incompatible with rationality and autono­
rJiY.""What if the Crown in Parliament were to order everyone to commit suicide 
or every father to kill his first-born? Here again, some official of the system 
might claim that his right to make any rules he likes is unlimited, and non­
autonoiiiOtls men might acknowledge this claim; but it is evident that the autono­
mous man cannot do so. As [ said before, there is a conflict here and may well be 
a tragedy. But contradiction and paradox only arise if we assume that the question 
'Has the official really got the right to give that order?' can be raised from a neutral 
standpoint outside political space-a point of view that is neither that of the official 
nor that of the subject. 
The second point is closely connected with the first. What is at issue here is whe­
ther one has a moral obligation to obey the commands of someone who, under the 
system of rules:nasa right to give those commands. To adopt the internal point of 
view is to acknowledge that one: has; but this obligation is limited not only by the 
rules of the system itself but by the fact that it may conflict wit!h other moral obli­
gations. If it does, a morally autonomous man may refuse to obey the orders of an 
official without in the least challenging the right of' the official to give the order. His 
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position is that the moral obligation to obey orders given by officials is, like other 
moral obligations, always def easible and happens, in this case, to be defeated by 
some other moral claim. His autonomy lies in the fact that the ultimate choice be­
tween conflicting moral claims always remains with him. There is no conflict be­
tween authority and autonomy here since in refusing to obey a legally valid order I 
am not denying the supremacy of the Crown in Parliament, not making the albsurd 
claim that I or anyone else can tell the Crown what laws it may or may not make; I 
am simply denying that my duty of obedience necessarily over-rides all other moral 
considerations. 
Armed with the distinction between the internal and external points of view and 
seeing that to adopt the internal point of view is not to assert anything but to per­
form a special kind of speech-act-sometimes literally a speech-act, as when we 
swear allegiance-we can set aside the question 'Can any government have de jure 
authority?' as formulated under a false impression. To ask me whether the present 
government of Canada has de jure authority is to ask whether ! adopt the internal 
point of view towards the conffifution of Canada and the answer (if it is of any in­
terest) is that I do. For to say that the government has de jure or legitimate author­
ity is not to make a statement of political fact, but to endorse, acknowledge, or re­
cognize its right to give me orders and a corresponding moral obligation on my part 
to obey-and this I do. Thus to say that an official has such and such powers is both 
to assert that the rules give him those powers and to express one's adherence to 
those rules. In its latter role, 'X has the authority to do Y' is in important ways like 
making a promise. (I am not arguing, as many theorists have, for the idea that one's 
obligation to obey the State arises from the making of a promise, only that the two 
kinds of obligation are analogous.) A man who makes a promise undertakes an obli­
gation, thereby limiting his options in the sense that certain courses of action (those 
incompatible with keeping the promise) that were formerly available to him are 
now no longer available. That is the difference that making a promise makes. If he 
is moral, he regards himself as bound to do what he has promised unless he has 
some justification or excuse for not so doing. Just what would constitute a justifica­
tion oi: excuse is, of course, often a very difficult matter to decide, depending on 
many factors in each individual case; but that all promises are defeasible by other 
moral claims is an inherent feature of the social practice of making promises. Mak· 
ing a promise limits one's options, but never reduces them to zero. In precisely the 
same way, I submit, adopting the internal point of view towards a regime gives rise 
to moral obligations, thus limiting one's options; but it does not involve giving the 
regime or its officials a blank check. 
VI 
My last methodological point is connected with the others and is, like them, all 
too familiar. Authority is a polymorphous concept, used not only in connection 
with the authority of officials or persons 'in authority'. In the example of the mere 
passenger who gets people to follow his lead in spite of having no official position I 
have already mentioned what is sometimes called 'charismatic' authority. The sense 
in which someone is said to be 'an authority on' Chinese vases or medieval music is 
another. Here part of what is meant is that he knows more about some topic than 
others do. But is that all? And if it is, why don't we say 'he knows more' and leave 
it at that? Why do we use the same word that we use in other contexts? In calling 
him an authority we assert both that he knows more and that, for that very reason, 
his opinions are worthy of respect and should, i f  a practical question arises, be fol-
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lowed. It is in this sense that doctors and lawyers are authorities on matters medical 
and legal, and it is rational to do what the doctor tells you to d o  'because he is the 
doctor', which must be understood to mean 'because he, being the doctor, knows 
better than you do'. 
However, there is one crucial respect in which recognizing the authority of an ex­
pert differs from recognizing that of an official of the State. Although some people 
who hold official positions-the captain of a ship, for example-hold them at least 
in part because they hav.e superior expertise, it would be absurd to pretend that this 
:is usually the case. Apart from the fact that elections are haphazard affairs and that 
many positions are held by political patronage that has little to do with fitness for 
the job, there is the more fundamental point that what is ultimately at issue is the 
rationality of adopting the internal point of view towards the constitution as a 
whole, not towards particular orders of particular officials. This is because the right 
claimed by an official is not based on superior knowledge (though we may hope he 
lhas that) but on the validity of a rule. And since there are no experts on the validity 
of constitutions we cannot give the same good reason for substituting the judge­
ment of another for our own that we can give in the case of a doctor. So the ques­
tion is whether we can find a different but analogous reason for (limited) submis­
sion to the authority of a State. I think we can, and indeed that in some circum­
stances it would be irrational not to forfeit one's autonomy to the extent required. 
The problems of political philosophy belong, not to the world of theory, but to 
that of practice-which is not to say that they are themselves practical problems. 
But when we are theorizing about practical problems we are theorizing about what 
t o  do and it is important to remember that action takes place at a certain time:-HIS­
torians and other seekers after theoretical truth may debate en.dlessly; nothing re­
quires them to accept any solution to a problem as final; but if I ask myself whether 
I should or should not adopt the int�rnal point of view towards the present govern­
ment of Canada, though I may brood on this question at a time when it is not press­
ing, I have to answer it whenever a situation arises in which I can choose between 
obedience and disobedience. The question 'What good reasons could I have?' does 
not mean 'What reason is sub specie actemitatis necessarily a valid reason?' It means 
'Are the reasons for adopting it that I can muster, here and now and situated as I 
am, better than those for not adopting it?'. This is not, of course, to say that I raise 
this fundamental question, or that I ought to raise it, or that I culpably forf eiit my 
autonomy by not raising it, every time a policeman tells me to pull over. The occa­
sions that require thinking through the argument are fortunately rare; but my argu­
ment runs, in brief, as follows: 
Men have different moral ideas and they do not always live up to those ideas­
still less to those of other people-and they have conflicting and competing inter­
ests. Only rarely can our aims, moral and non-moral, be fulfilled without the non­
interference, even the active co-operation of others. Given these rather obvious facts 
plus the fact that, in practical affairs, we have to act and therefore to decide within 
i1fuite time, it would be irrational not to accept some way of settling disputes as 
authoritative and final. For example, the important decision as to whether a man 
goes to prison or goes free depends on the verdict of a judge or jury-and the verdict 
may be wrong in the sense that he is found guilty of some crime that he did not in 
fact commit. We devise rules of procedure to minimize such errors and we allow ap­
peals; but at some point a final determination of the case must be made. That is in­
herent in the human situation, and it would be irrational to reject all systems on the 
grounds that any system includes the possibility of error. The same principle ap­
plies, I submit, over the whole field of politics. If it is true that we cannot fulfill our aims, 
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including our moral aims, without a framework of institutions that always provides 
for final determination of disputes and if any such framework entails submission to 
authority, it can be neither rational nor moral to refuse to adopt the internal point 
of view towards any system. So the real problem about authority is not Wolff's 
question 'How is it possible for a rational autonomous man to submit to authority 
at all?' but 'Under what .conditions can such a man submit to it?'. To answer this 
question would take at least a book, since it would involve a discussion of the rival 
merits of different types of institutions. So I shall not even begin to try to answer it 
here, remarking only that since the value to each of us of being a member of a com­
munity which has authoritative ways of settling disputes is not necessarily depen­
dent on our participating in the making of the rules, 'making my own laws' is not 
one of the necessary conditions of rational submission to authority. In Plato's State 
it would have been entirely rational for all the citizens to submit to the authority of 
the Guardians; and if good arguments for the superiority of democratic institutions 
are to be found, they are to be found, not on any Kantian principle of autonomy, 
but in the empirical fact (if it is a fact) that democratic institutions are the best safe­
guard against the abuse of power. 
VII 
It remains to clear up what might seem to be an inconsistency in my thesis. I 
have insisted that authority is always authority under some rule, but this is not true 
of the mere passenger in my story of the sinking ship who, I said, exercised author· 
ity over the other passengers. How, since authority is a polymorphous concept, I 
might retreat into saying that he has authority 'in a different sense', to be distin­
guished from both political authority conferred by rules and theoretical authority 
conferred by the possession of expertise. This is indeed true; the senses are not iden­
tical, but such ad hoc moves in philosophy are rightly suspect, and it is not an acci­
dent that we invoke the concept of authority in the.se three ways and perhaps more. 
My account of political authority as intelligible only in terms of a rule-governed 
practice requires a distinction between the reason for obeying an official, which is 
always of the form 'because h e  is entitled under some rule of the system to give that 
order' and the reason for adopting the internal point of view towards the system as 
a whole· or-what comes to the same thing-towards what Hart calls its Rule of Rec­
ognition. This is the fundamental rule by reference to which all the rules of the sys­
tem can be tested for validity. Since it cannot, ex hypothesi, be tested for validity 
itself without an infinite regress, all we can say about it from the external point of 
view is that it is or is not in fact accepted by the members of a community. But the 
Rule of Recognition may itself be unclear, and in fact always is unclear in modern 
societies in which there is no locatable sovereign. It follows that we cannot ask such 
questions as 'What ought to happen, under the constitution, if a President defies an 
order of the Supreme court?' and always expect a clear answer. Recent events i n  
the United States have made this dramatically clear. No one, for example, could be 
said to know whether impeachment was a political or a judicial process, and the rea­
son was not that the question was one of great difficulty but t!hat the Constitution 
of the United States could ·not provide an answer. At this point all we can do is to 
ask 'What would happen if ... ?' and be guided by historical examples of what fild. 
happen when Roosevelt threatened to pack the Supreme Court or Nixon threat.erl­
ed not to obey its orders. 
Over and over again men in official positions have 'exceeded their authority' in 
the sense of giving orders w!hich on a strict-or indeed any reasonable-construction 
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of the rules they were not entitled to give. Lincoln's abolition of slave property in 
the territories was in flagrant violation of the Supreme Court's ruling in the Dred 
Scott case, and Lincoln expanded the power of the Presidency in other ways that 
were constitutionally at least dubious. He got away with it because he had the re­
spect of an overwhelming majority in the nation-except in the then impotent South. 
Other Presidents have tried to expand the power of the Presidency in unconstitu­
tional or dubiously constitu.tional ways and have not got away with it because they 
lacked that respect. Especially in times of crisis, but also at other times, men will 
adopt the internal point of view towards the instructions of someone, even if he has 
no official position, who has acquired their respect; and they will refuse to follow 
his lead if he has lost their respect, even if he still has an official position which en· 
titles him to give them orders. The point of my story about the authoritative passen­
ger was that the other passengers followed his lead without thinking the matter out; 
they obeyed him because they respected him, and he obtained their respect in ways 
that you may call 'non-rational' if you like. In the same way the exercise of author­
ity in the State is, in the end, not dependent on the validity of rules but on respect 
for its institutions and for those who man them-s,o that the political authority of 
official persons turns out not to be so very different from that of unofficial persons 
after all. 
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